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Abstract 
The probability of an event occurring and the reward associated with the event can both 
modulate behaviour. Response times are decreased to stimuli that are either more rewarding or 
more likely. These two factors can be combined to give an Expected Value (EV) associated with 
the event (i.e. probability of the event x reward magnitude).  In four experiments we investigate 
the effect of reward and probability on both saccadic and manual responses.  When tested 
separately we find evidence for both a reward and probability effect across response types. When 
manipulations of reward magnitude and probability of the event were combined, the probability 
modulations dominated and these data were not well accounted for by the EV. However, a post-
hoc model that included an additional intrinsic reward associated with responding provided an 
excellent account for the data. We argue that reward consists of both an explicit and intrinsic 
component. In our task, the saccadic and manual responses are linked to the information provided 
by the targets and the goals of the task, and successful completion of these is in itself rewarding. 
As a result targets associated with a higher probability of being presented have a higher intrinsic 
reward.   
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Introduction 
Human behaviour is shaped by both the properties of the environment and of the 
individual. In any exploration task one property of the environment that is important is the 
likelihood of the target occurring in a particular location.  Equally a property of the individual 
that will shape behaviour is the particular value that they place on the target.  Take for 
example a child searching for a cuddly toy to take to bed to help them drop off to sleep.  She 
may know that it is quite likely that her favourite elephant was left behind at her grandparents 
and so is unlikely to be in the house and at the same time know that her less preferred squirrel 
is almost certainly in the kitchen.  How is the child meant to combine the probability 
information with the reward value information associated with her two toys to shape her 
search behaviour? 
One way in which these factors can combine is by Expected Value (EV: the product of 
the probability of rewarded event and the magnitude of reward associated with it). In the 
economic literature, the expected value of future rewards is the sum of possible reward 
magnitudes where each is weighted by its probability (Tobler, Fiorillo, & Schultz, 2005). 
When considering rewards that occupy spatial locations, like the example above, there are 
two distinct ways in which probability can be defined.  In the first, ‘probability’ is the 
probability of getting a reward from a given object at a location. In the second the 
‘probability’ is the likelihood of an object being in a given location, but the reward associated 
with that object is fixed. Is it the second of these cases that is illustrated by the example of the 
child looking for their toy and is the focus of the current paper.  Such condition haves been  
investigated by Milstein and Dorris (2007), who manipulated target reward probability in dual 
target trials by varying the probability of left vs right target presentation and manipulated the 
reward magnitude associated with each target. They found that EV predicted saccadic 
behaviour better than the probability of a rewarded event or reward magnitude alone. 
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Allowing behaviour to be shaped by EV has an evolutionary advantage as it means that the 
individual will maximise the intake of reward over time (Milstein & Dorris, 2007). This 
behavioural data is supported by neurophysiological studies showing that dopamine neurons, 
known to play an important role in reward processing, encode a combination of reward 
magnitude and probability (e.g. Expected Value) rather than distinguishing between the two 
(Tobler, Fiorillo, & Schultz, 2005). Understanding of this system has partly arisen from 
neurological and psychiatric disorders involving changes in dopaminergic levels (e.g. 
schizophrenia, Parkinson’s disease, drug addiction) where processing of reward is 
dysfunctional (Dreher & Tremblay, 2009).  
Supporting this, many behavioural studies in non-human primates have shown that 
saccadic responses have shorter latencies to targets that are associated with reward than to 
those that are not (Kawagoe, Takikawa, & Hikosaka, 1998; Takikawa, Kawagoe, Itoh, 
Nakahara, & Hikosaka, 2002). Additionally, Milstein and Dorris (2007, 2011) have shown 
that it is the relative value of a stimulus that affects choice and saccadic reaction times, rather 
than the global magnitude of reward available in a trial. They found that saccadic preparation 
is spatially allocated based on the relative value of potential targets. This is also supported by 
the economic literature: prospect theory posits that value (or utility) of an action is relative to 
the other available options (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Allocating time and resources 
towards more profitable options relative to others may be more adaptive than being globally 
motivated by the prospect of reward.  Several studies have also shown that these reward 
effects persist even after reward is no longer associated with these stimuli (Dunne, Ellison, & 
Smith, 2015; Stankevich & Geng, 2015; Theeuwes & Belopolsky, 2012). 
The probability of the occurrence of stimuli in different locations has long been known 
to affect our response (Kaufman & Levy, 1966; Lamb & Kaufman, 1965; Mowbray, 1964) 
and the probability effect is particularly well established for a saccadic response (Basso & 
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Wurtz, 1997; Carpenter & Williams, 1995; Dorris & Munoz, 1998; Jóhannesson, Haraldsson 
& Kristjánsson, 2013; Koval, Ford & Everling, 2004; Liu et al., 2010, 2011; Noorani & 
Carpenter, 2013). For example, it has been shown that for two target locations, decreasing the 
relative probability of target presentation in a location increases the saccadic reaction time 
(Carpenter & Williams, 1995).  
Only a few studies (e.g. Milstein and Dorris, 2007, 2011) have examined the 
relationship between the processing of reward and probability information, and the 
mechanisms that could govern these effects. One common mechanism for the effect of both 
factors on response times could be attention. Theeuwes and Belopolsky (2012) demonstrated 
a link between increases in the associating reward with a target and increased attentional 
capture.  Studies of the effect of target probability have used a pro- and anti-saccade task 
alongside a probability manipulation (Koval et al., 2004; Liu et al., 2010) and proposing that 
the higher location probabilities demand more attention, based on the finding that the anti-
saccade cost (longer latencies and more errors) was only present in anti-saccades trials away 
from the presented high probability target location (Liu et al., 2010). This attentional 
framework explains the increased difficulty in inhibiting prosaccades to the high probability 
location during antisaccades to the opposite location and provides an explanation as to why 
pro-saccades to lower probability locations take longer to be executed (Liu et al., 2010).  
One alternative way to conceptualise the probability of a stimulus is as expectation, 
which could guide attention towards a likely location of a relevant item (Summerfield & 
Egner, 2009).  However, the similarities between attention and expectation are not reflected 
in the neural activity in visual regions representing the stimulus, and some neurophysiological 
research has shown that reward (defined as “motivation”) and attention contribute 
independently to influence the responses (Bendiksby & Platt, 2006; Summerfield & Egner, 
2009). One way in which reward and probability may contribute to attention (but not directly 
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change it) in a similar way is by increasing the salience of the target that is associated with 
high reward value or probability. Many studies in the reward literature have linked reward 
associations with increasing salience, which is defined as the physical, “bottom-up” 
distinctiveness of an object relative to other objects in the environment (Fecteau & Munoz, 
2006).  
Supporting these behavioural similarities between probability and reward processing, 
Nakahara, Nakamura and Hikosaka (2006) demonstrated that prior knowledge about the 
reward associated with a stimulus leads to a bias in the excitability of SC neurons and neural 
activity in the superior colliculus (SC).  These effects preceded target selection and were 
found to increase as the probability (of any rewarded event) increased (Basso & Wurtz, 1997; 
Dorris & Munoz, 1998; Liu et al., 2011). In addition, a study separately investigating both 
prior knowledge of reward (probability of receiving reward from given response rather than 
differing magnitude) or probability of target location found that these factors shape 
perception and action in parallel and suggests that a shared sensory weight amplifies 
perceptual experience while biasing motor action driven by attention and EV (Liston & 
Stone, 2008). These results suggest that the effects of reward and probability on decision-
making processes across different response modalities may be governed by the same system 
or overlap in some way. 
The majority of previous human and primate studies on manipulations of reward and 
probability have focused on one response modality. The premotor theory of attention 
postulates that processes involved in spatial attention and selection of motor responses share a 
common neural substrate (Eimer, Van Velzen, Gherri, & Press, 2006; Rizzolatti, Riggio, & 
Sheliga, 1994). This theory suggests that attentional shifts arise as a by-product of activity 
within the oculomotor system. Within this model any effects on attention should be common 
and correlated across both oculomotor and manual response preparation (Eimer et al., 2006; 
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Rizzolatti et al., 1994). If common attentional modulation underpins the effects of both 
reward and probability on behaviour then, in turn, this suggests that both reward and 
probability should affect both oculomotor and manual response preparation in a similar and 
correlated way. Decision-making models for visuomotor behaviour generally propose that a 
visual event produces an internal response, rising with time until a decision threshold is 
reached and a motor response is initiated (Bompas & Sumner, 2008). Within the pre-motor 
theory of attention, a single such process would be used for all types of motor responses and 
the same decision threshold would apply to all responses: response time would then be the 
sum of stimulus processing time and motor latency where the latter is the only source of 
difference between response types (Bompas & Sumner, 2008). A number of studies have 
shown support for this theory, for example Taylor, Carpenter and Anderson (2006) found 
similar parameters in manual and saccadic response times for visual processing of contrast, 
supporting a common target detection stage preceding each type of reaction. Research by 
Bompas and Sumner (2008) partially supports these differences between processes, but 
specifically investigating manual and saccadic reaction times. They found that the difference 
in reaction times to S-cone (blue cone) and luminance signals was larger for saccade latencies 
than for manual responses (Bompas & Sumner, 2008). This could suggest that saccadic 
responses can take better advantage of fast signals when they are available (Bompas & 
Sumner, 2008). This result is not compatible with the suggestion that the same target 
detection stage is used for manual and saccadic responses (Taylor et al., 2006).  An 
alternative, but less parsimonious model, would propose a common collector stage where 
signals across all pathways are brought together but have different decision thresholds for 
different responses (Bompas & Sumner, 2008). However, Bompas and Sumner (2008) found 
no evidence for a correlation between saccadic and manual reaction times; a correlation 
would be expected if they both relied on the same combination of signals. Together these 
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results suggest a more complex explanation beyond the premotor theory of attention for the 
similarities and differences between manual and saccadic responses, but do provide a strong 
rational for further investigation in this area. 
Here we report a series of four experiments, the first three of which concurrently investigate 
saccadic and manual responses. Across all four experiments, participants were required to 
look at a single target presented on the left or right of a screen. The target contained a capital 
letter T and the participants had to respond with a different manual response if the T was the 
correct orientation or inverted. In Experiment 1 we manipulated the probability of a target 
being presented on the left or the right-hand side. In Experiment 2 we investigated the 
absolute and relative reward associated with two targets. In Experiment 3 we combined these 
two manipulations to examine whether these factors combine in a simple manner and in 
Experiment 4 we examined the two manipulations separately within participants.  
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General Method 
Procedure 
Figure 1.  
The sequence of events in a single example trial is illustrated in Figure 1. The task for the 
participants was to respond to the “T” stimuli that appeared to the left or right of a central 
fixation point.  The response required was to indicate the orientation of a letter with a manual 
button press.  In Experiments 1 to 3, if the letter was on the left-hand side of the display the 
response was made with the left hand and if the letter was on the right-hand side the response 
was made with the right hand. Each block in each of the four experiments was proceeded by a 
9-point calibration procedure to allow accurate eye tracking. 
All studies reported here were approved by The Faculty of Science Human Research 
Ethics Committee at the University of Bristol. 
Stimuli 
All stimuli and the fixation square were white (16.4 cd/m2) and displayed on a grey 
background (10.4 cd/m2). A trial commenced with a centrally presented fixation square (1.65o 
x 1.65o; 0.18o thick) which was presented for 1.5s. This was immediately followed by the 
circular target with a T or inverted T in the centre.  The circle had a diameter of 1.85o and a 
line thickness of 0.18o.  The letter T subtended 0.3o, which is a size that Körner and Gilchrist 
(2007) have shown is small enough not to be recognised reliably above chance when fixation 
was 3o away from the stimuli. This ensured that participants had to make an accurate target 
directed saccadic eye movement towards the target to complete the task. The target was 
presented on the left or right in a varying number of trials across all phases of the four 
experiments at 6o eccentricity.  
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The pre-test block was included in all four experiments to set an individual criterion for 
the time-out for the testing phase.  In the practice and pre-test phases the fixation square 
contained an X in red (15.8 cd/m2; font size 17).  After a successful response to the letter T, 
an X was presented in the target in a golden yellow colour (19.8 cd/m2). These colours were 
chosen to match the reward stimuli colours in the later Experiments (2 to 4). The distribution 
of manual response times from the pre-test block of the experiment was used to calculate a 
70th percentile of each participant’s reaction time distribution. Without informing the 
participants, their individual 70th percentile values were used as the length of time the target 
and letter T would be visible in testing phase trials, after which they would receive the time-
out notice. This ensured that participants were motivated to respond as quickly as possible.  
During the testing phase of all four experiments in this paper, participants were clearly 
informed before each block of the probabilities (e.g. ‘the probability of the target appearing 
on the right is 75%’) and reward magnitudes (e.g. ‘£2’) associated with each target. 
Apparatus 
All the experiments were controlled by Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997) 
running within Matlab on Windows 7.  The display was 17” running at 75Hz and with a 
resolution of 1600 x 1200 pixels, and the viewing distance was 57cm. 
Movements of the right eye were recorded at a sampling rate of 1000Hz by the Eyelink 
II (SR Research, Canada) which has a typical operating spatial resolution of 0.5o. The 
participants were provided with a chin and forehead rest to minimise head movements. In 
experiments 1 to 3, manual responses were recorded via the keyboard (numeric right-hand 
section) – key 4 and 1 for the left hand and key 6 and 3 for the right-hand responses. 
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Experiment 1: Probability 
Methods 
Procedure 
The layout of the task was as described in the general method. Experiment 1 consisted 
of a practice phase (10 trials), a pre-test phase (48 trials), and then 6 blocks (48 trials each) of 
the testing phase. The testing phase consisted of three block types. In the first, the target was 
equally likely to be on the right or the left-hand side. In the second, the target was presented 
on one side with probability 0.75 and the other side with probability 0.25. In the third, 
probabilities were then flipped.  The three probability block types were split into two separate 
consecutive blocks of 48 trials. The probabilities were pseudo-random being fixed at 50%, 
75% or 25% of the total number of trials in the block. The order of these fixed trials were 
then randomised for the length of the block. 
Stimuli 
All the stimuli were as described in the general method. In addition, during the pre-test 
phase the fixation square contained a plus sign as a fixation point, which was presented in red 
(15.8 cd/m2; font size 17). No reward value was ever shown. 
The participants also received feedback if they were too slow, or made an incorrect 
response. A message appeared in the centre of the screen reading “Wrong!” or “Too slow!” 
(2.5o above fixation and white). After the response to the letter T, the empty target location 
marker (or error message) stayed on the screen for 1.5 seconds.  
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Participants 
Eighteen participants (8 male) were recruited from the student population of the 
University of Bristol (approximate age range 18-25). All had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. Participants were reimbursed £7 for their time and given no other additional reward 
incentive. 
Design 
There was one within participant repeated measure binary factor: probability block type 
(75/25, 50/50, 25/75). Combining data from the right and left sides lead to three conditions: 
75% probability, 50% probability and 25% probability. 
The orders of conditions were counterbalanced using a latin square design. The 
dependent measures were the manual response time and saccade latency. 
Manual Response Analysis 
A total of 5184 trials were recorded (288 x 18 participants).  The total number of errors 
in manual responses (time-out/response errors) made was 550, leaving 4634 trials to be 
analysed. The range of the total percentage of time-out/response errors of each participant’s 
responses was 4.17% to 21.9%. Each participant’s median responses were analysed and this 
convention was maintained across the experiments reported in this paper.  
Saccadic Response Analysis 
A general exclusion criterion was applied to initial fixation starting point: excluding 
trials where the initial fixation was greater than 3 degrees either side of the centre of the 
fixation box (21.3% excluded, range across participants: 3.13-36.1%). This was a liberal 
criterion as there was no specific fixation instruction to participants in the experiment. An 
additional criteria was applied so that all saccades initiated after the participant’s ‘time-out’ 
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were discarded. Two participant’s data had over 40% of trials excluded at this point, and were 
therefore removed from the rest of the saccadic analysis. There was no spatial exclusion 
criterion on the landing point of the first saccade, but saccades toward the incorrect side were 
discarded as errors (3.1% excluded, range across participants: 0-7.29%). The remaining trials 
had a mean first saccade amplitude of 6.0 degrees (range across participants: 5.5 – 6.4 
degrees). This shows that generally all participants were making a large hypo-metric orienting 
saccade for their first saccade. 
 Of the saccades directed to the incorrect side, 91.5 % had a latency of less than 90ms 
and these are assumed to be anticipatory. In addition to reflect this anticipatory criteria all 
saccades with reaction times less than 90ms in the correct direction were excluded (4.8%, 
range across participants: 0.69-12.2%). Some saccades within the incorrect saccades and 
anticipatory saccades categories had negative response times, due to the saccade being on-
going during the target onset. These saccades were included in the anticipatory analysis as 
they still reflect an anticipation of the target appearing on a particular side. Six of the 
anticipatory saccades were removed before analysing the frequencies, due to either errors in 
the eye tracker, or saccades disrupted by blinks. After removing the invalid, anticipatory and 
error saccades, the total number of analysed saccades was 3260 (70.8%). Each participant’s 
median responses were analysed.  
 
 
 
 
 
Reward and Probability 
 
 
14 
Results 
Manual Responses 
 
Table 1.  
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Figure 2.  
 
The manual results are plotted in Figure 2. A significant effect of target probability on 
manual response times was seen, with a 14 ms (95% CI: 6.31 – 21.8ms) increase in response 
time from 0.5 and 0.25 target probability, and a 21ms (95% CI: 10.9 – 30.5ms) decrease in 
response times between 0.5 and 0.75 probability (Repeated Measures ANOVA: [F(2,17) = 
26.65, p < 0.01]; Effect size (partial ETA squared) = 0.61). Additionally, there was evidence 
that this effect had a significantly linear trend [F(1,17) = 35.76, p < 0.001]. 
Error rates are reported in Table 1. There was a significant effect of error type (time-
out/response errors) (Repeated Measures ANOVA: [F(1,17) =8.2, p = 0.01]; Effect size 
(partial ETA squared) = 0.33) and target probability (Repeated Measures ANOVA: [F(2,17) = 
4.55, p = 0.02]; Effect size (partial ETA squared) =  0.21). There were slightly more time-out 
errors than response errors recorded, and the frequency of errors increased a small amount as 
the probability decreased.   
Saccadic Responses 
In the saccadic data there was a significant linear trend between the mean response 
times across the three spatial probabilities (Repeated Measures ANOVA within-subjects 
contrast: [F(1, 15) = 9.84, p = 0.007]; Effect size (Partial ETA squared) = 0.4) (Figure 2). No 
significant difference was found between the percentages of saccades that were anticipatory 
across the spatial probabilities. This was not present in the anticipatory saccades in the 
incorrect direction (Repeated Measures ANOVA: [F(2, 15) = 2.08 , p = 0.14]; Effect size 
(Partial ETA squared) = 0.58), or in the correct direction anticipatory saccades  [F(2, 15) = 
2.2, p = 0.13]  
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The relationship between the manual and saccadic responses within participants was 
investigated by calculating the size of the probability effect between 0.75 and 0.25 probability 
for each participant. The two participants excluded just from the saccadic analysis were 
excluded from these calculations. There was no significant correlation between the two 
response modalities (correlation coefficient = 0.11, N.S. p = 0.65). 
 
Experiment 1: Discussion 
Our results support the existing literature showing that response times are increased as 
the probability is decreased, and conversely decreased as the probability is increased 
(Carpenter & Williams, 1995). However, the probability effect is clearest in the manual 
responses, compared to the saccadic responses. This supports the finding that within the 
saccadic system this effect is not always present or robust (Jóhannesson et al., 2013). One 
reason we might not have seen a strong saccadic effect is the length of the inter-stimulus 
interval (ISI; time from onset of fixation until onset of the target). The ISI was relatively long 
at a constant of 1.5 seconds. If we compare this ISI duration with the existing literature, 
Antonaides et al. (2014) replicated Carpenter and Williams’ (1995) probability effect in 
healthy older adults using the same method with an ISI of between 0.5 and 1 second. In 
contrast, in a similar paradigm Jóhannesson et al. (2013) found no effect of probability 
(0.75/0.5/0.25) on saccadic response times: the ISI they used was 0.6 to 1.6 seconds. It could 
be that manipulations of target probability will only strongly modulate saccadic response 
times when the ISI is short (no longer than 1 second). 
There is some discussion in the literature about the underlying mechanisms that lead to 
these probability effects.  Two mechanisms have been proposed (see Walthew and Gilchrist, 
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2006).  In the first, the effect of probability arises from the long-term learning of the locations 
that are more frequent.  In the second, the effects are a result of inter-trial repetition.  The 
argument here is that higher probability locations are more likely to be proceeded by a target 
at the location in the previous trial and it is these immediate repetitions that drive the 
probability effects.  Under some circumstances it would appear that these local mechanisms 
alone support probability effects (Walthew and Gilchrist, 2006) although not always and this 
may depend on the exact experimental set-up (Druker & Anderson, 2010; Jones & Kaschak 
2012).  To investigate this is the current data we analysed the manual response time data as the 
effects were more robust for this response type.  Repetitions of the previous location lead to a 
15 ms decrease in reaction time (95% CI: 5 – 25ms) but the effect of probability was still 
present, and of a similar magnitude, when we compared high and low probability trials that 
were proceeded by the opposite type of trial: 31ms difference (95% CI: 15 – 46 ms) and trials 
that were proceeded by the same type of trial: 27ms difference (95% CI: 8 – 45 ms) . This 
suggests that the probability effect in this particular set-up is driven by a long-term learning 
mechanism rather than repetition, despite repetition effects being present.1 
  
 
Experiment 2: Lottery controlled reward 
In Experiment 2 we investigated the facilitation of saccadic and manual response times 
by increasing reward value. We employed a random lottery incentive reward system, which 
means that one trial is selected at random from the whole experiment and the participant 
                                                 
1 The means in this analysis are slightly different from the main results due to response errors (but not time-out 
errors) being included in this calculation. This is done to maximise the number of trials we have for this analysis 
particularly for the low probability trials.  
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receives the reward from that trial (Cubitt, Starmer, & Sugden, 1998). The validity of this 
system in economic experiments has been tested and shown to have no significant difference 
on behaviour in comparison to a design where participants are rewarded on every trial (Cubitt 
et al., 1998). This addresses the problem of the salience of rewards, as large monetary reward 
values can be used without having to rely on a points-based rewards system that may not 
provide enough of an explicit link to monetary rewards. 
 
 
Methods 
Procedure 
The task layout was as described in the general method and similar to Experiment 1. The 
experiment consisted of a practice phase (10 trials), a pre-test phase (48 trials), and then 4 
blocks (72 trials each) of the testing phase. In the testing phase correct responses on each trial 
were associated with a reward.  The reward value was displayed on each trial at the location 
of the target after the response was given. Participants were informed that a trial from the 
testing phase would be selected at random at the end of the experiment and that they would 
receive that reward. If the manual response was too slow or incorrect then a message was 
displayed after the trial. Participants were informed at the outset of the experiment that they 
were to receive no reward if one of these error trials was selected at the end of the 
experiment. All participants were explicitly told the reward values associated with the block 
they were about to perform and also the reward values associated with each side of the 
display. Across the testing phase one side of the display (left or right hand targets) was 
consistently associated with a higher reward than the other. In the high reward blocks, the 
reward associated with the high rewarded side was £10, and the lower reward side was £1. In 
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the low reward blocks, the value for the highly rewarded side was £1, and the lower target 
side was £0.10. Left and right targets were equally likely to be presented. 
Stimuli 
The targets, letter “T” and the fixation square were the same as in Experiment 1 and 
outlined in the general method. In the testing phase there were two block types – low reward 
blocks and high reward blocks. The fixation square contained a single pound sign (£) in the 
low reward magnitude blocks and three pound signs (£££) in the high magnitude blocks.  All 
pound signs were presented in red (15.8 cd/m2). 
These reward values (including the pound sign) were presented inside the 
corresponding target after a successful manual response to the target in each trial. The 
rewards were presented in a golden yellow colour (19.8 cd/m2). If the participant was too 
slow, or made an incorrect response, no reward value was shown and a message appeared in 
the centre of the screen reading “Wrong! No reward” or “Too slow! No reward” (2.5o above 
fixation and white). The reward value (or error message) stayed on the screen for 1.5 seconds.  
Participants 
Eighteen participants (5 male) were recruited from the student population of the 
University of Bristol (approximate age range 18-25). All had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. Participants were reimbursed £7 for their time and received a variable performance 
related reward (£0, £0.1, £1 or £10) as outlined above.   
Design 
There were two within participant repeated measure binary factors: block (high or low 
reward) and side (high or low reward) leading to four conditions: high block, high side (£10 
reward); high block, low side (£1); low block, high side (£1); low block, low side (£0.1).   
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The order of the blocks and the side with the high reward were counterbalanced using a latin 
square design across participants.  The dependent measures were the manual response time 
and saccade latency. 
Manual Response Analysis 
A total of 5184 trials were recorded (288 x 18 participants). One participant was 
removed before further analysis because over 50% of their saccadic responses did not meet 
the fixation criteria applied. Given the magnitude of this percentage (68.4%), we decided to 
remove this participant from the manual analysis as well.  We analysed the remaining manual 
reaction times excluding 839 time-out or response errors, leaving a total of 4131 data points. 
The distribution of errors is shown in Table 2. The range of the total percentage of time-
out/response errors of each participant’s responses was 3.1% - 36.1%. 
Saccadic Response Analysis 
We applied the same general exclusion criteria to initial fixation starting point as in 
Experiment 1.  Trials were excluded if: the initial fixation was greater than 3 degrees from 
centre (11.9%, range across participants 0-33%); the saccades were in the incorrect direction 
(2.41%, range across participants 0-7.29%) or anticipatory (5.64%, range across participants 
0-22.9%).  The total number of remaining saccades was 3918 (80.0%). The remaining trials 
had a mean first saccade amplitude of 6.19 degree (range across participants 5.43 – 6.74), 
showing that all participants were, in general, making a large hyper-metric orienting saccade 
for their first saccade. 
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Results 
Manual Responses 
 
Table 2. 
 
Figure 3. 
 
The results are presented in Figure 3. Reward associated with the target side had a 
significant effect on manual reaction times leading to a 19.1ms (95% CI: 6.44 – 31.73) 
decrease (high condition) and 6.2ms (95% CI: -2.5 – 14.9) decrease (low condition) in 
response times for the high reward side (Repeated Measures ANOVA: [F(1,16) = 7.8, p = 
0.01]; Effect size (partial ETA squared = 0.33).  The effect of reward condition was not 
significant (Repeated Measures ANOVA: [F(1,16) = 0.93, p = 0.35]), but the interaction 
between the reward condition and target side was significant [F(1,16) = 7.2, p = 0.02; Effect 
size (partial ETA squared = 0.31)]. There was no significant effect of target side/reward 
condition on the frequency of errors (Repeated Measures ANOVA: Target Side: [F(1, 16) = 
2.59, p = 0.13)], Reward Condition: [F(1,16) = 0.49, p = 0.49)]), or between the different 
types of errors (Table 2) [F(1, 16) = 1.78, p = 0.2]. 
Reaction times to the £1 target in the high reward condition (low side) are on average 
slower by 9.47ms (95% CI: -2.27 – 21.22ms) than to the target associated with the same 
reward in the low reward condition (high side) (see Figure 3), however this difference was 
not significant (Post-hoc Paired Samples t-test:  [t(16) = 1.7, p = 0.11). This trend suggests 
that the effect of the reward values on reaction times may dependent on the context within 
which they are presented.  
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Saccadic Responses  
There was no significant effect of reward condition (block) (Repeated Measures 
ANOVA: [F(1, 16) = 2.75, p = 0.12]) or reward side [F(1, 16) = 2.46, p = 0.14] but there was 
a significant interaction ([F(1, 16) = 13.45, p = 0.002]; Effect size (Partial ETA) = 0.46). 
Post-hoc testing on the high reward block in isolation shows a significant effect of reward 
side (Mean 125ms vs. 132ms, Paired Samples t-test: [t(16) = -2.769, p = 0.014]). This could 
indicate that although reward affects saccadic reaction times relatively (high vs. low within a 
block), the overall saliency of a highly rewarded condition has some influence. Further 
analysis showed no effect of reward condition or reward side on the frequency of anticipatory 
saccades; anticipatory in the incorrect direction (Repeated Measures ANOVA: Reward 
condition: [F(1, 16) = 0.7, p = 0.41], Reward side: [F(1, 16) = 1.31, p = 0.27]), anticipatory in 
the correct direction (Repeated Measures ANOVA: Reward condition: [F(1, 16) = 0.23, p = 
0.64], Reward side: [F(1, 16) = 3.42, p = 0.08]).  
To investigate if there was a relationship between individual performances across the 
two response modalities (saccadic and manual) we calculated the size of the reward effect for 
each of the 17 participants in the high and the low reward blocks separately. There was no 
strong correlation between the two response modalities: the Pearson’s correlation r was 0.457 
(p = 0.065) and 0.365 (p = 0.149) for the high and low reward conditions respectively.  
 
Experiment 2: Discussion 
The effect of reward on both the manual and saccadic component of the response is 
consistent with the idea that reward processes mediated by dopamine neurons affect all 
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response systems irrespective of response modality (Schultz, 2010). However the clearest test 
of this association would be a strong correlation between the size of the reward effects across 
modalities.  In the current experiment we found no such strong correlations.  In other words, 
participants who showed a particularly strong reward effect in their saccadic responses were 
not necessarily the ones who showed a strong reward effect in their manual responses, or vice 
versa.  This reflects the results we found in Experiment 1 for the probability manipulation. 
In the low reward blocks in Experiment 2 there was a reduction in the difference between 
high and low reward targets for manual responses, and no evidence of an effect of reward for 
saccadic responses. However, there is a trend for faster reaction times to the £1 target when it 
is the high reward target (in the low reward blocks). This supports the evidence suggesting 
that the relative value of a stimulus that affects choice and saccadic reaction times (Milstein 
& Dorris, 2007, 2011) but also suggests there is a global reward component. The values of £1 
and £0.10 are really quite low despite the relative difference between them, therefore global 
motivation could be lessened and this is likely to be why we see a smaller effect across 
modalities.  
As discussed in the introduction, there is evidence to suggest a common system for 
reward processing that affects all motor systems to optimise the chance of getting the reward. 
Reward-related activity in the dopamine system initiates a series of events—one stage of 
which involves the anterior cingulate that eventually leads to changes in sensory 
representation (Hickey, Chelazzi, & Theeuwes, 2010a). Anterior cingulate and surrounding 
cortex is also known to be fundamentally involved in the control of attention and processing 
of attended stimuli (Hickey et al., 2010a; Hopfinger, Buonocore, & Mangun, 2000; Mesulam, 
1999) A study using TMS (transcranial magnetic stimulation) found that the ACC (anterior 
cingulate cortex) facilitates implementation of a selected action, and is activated across three 
different output modalities (verbal, manual, oculomotor) (Paus, 2001). However, the 
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difference in the results reported here between the effect of reward on response times in 
manual and saccadic modalities might suggest otherwise. These differences could be 
explained by the effect that reward has on motor systems over time, if dopaminergic 
activation drives the reaction time effect. The dopamine reward signal is rapid and differs 
from the slower dopamine responses that have been associated with uncertainty, punishment 
and movement (Schultz, 2007). Activations in dopamine neurons to primary rewards, novel 
stimuli and reward-predicting stimuli have latencies of 60-100ms and endure for less than 
200ms (Schultz, 2007). Given our results show very fast saccadic reaction times, it could be 
that the saccadic response is initiated too early to be strongly affected by the dopaminergic 
activation. This could be plausible if we assume that the dopamine activation occurs after the 
onset of the target given that the reward values are known. The manual responses however 
are much slower, and therefore could be affected more by the dopamine surge.   
It is very interesting that this behavioural result on saccadic and manual responses is 
similar to what we see in the probability manipulation in Experiment 1. This supports the 
research discussed in the introduction of neurophysiological studies showing that dopamine 
neurons encode a combination of magnitude and probability (e.g. expected value) rather than 
distinguishing between the two (Tobler, Fiorillo & Schultz, 2005), and could suggest that the 
probability effect is more closely linked to reward processing even in the absence of primary 
rewards.  
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Experiment 3: Combined reward and probability 
 
 To investigate the interactions between the effect of reward and probability on saccadic 
and manual responses, the next step was to combine these two factors within our paradigm to 
see if they combine in a simple manner. In Experiment 3, we investigate this across two 
response modalities to further understand the differences between these processes. As in 
Milstein and Dorris’ (2007, 2011) study we manipulate the probability and reward associated 
with potential responses by varying the probability of the left vs. target presentation as well as 
the magnitude of reward associated with each. This allows us to vary the relative expected 
value of response to each target. This also reflects the paradigm in Experiment 1 (without the 
reward component) to allow for clearer comparison and continuity. In Experiment 3a, the 
reward values were kept constant and the probabilities manipulated across blocks, whereas in 
Experiment 3b the probability values were constant and the reward manipulated.  
 
Methods 
Procedure 
The task was the same as in Experiment 2. The experiment consisted of a practice phase 
(10 trials), a pre-test phase (48 trials), and then 9 blocks (48 trials each) of the testing phase. 
The reward schedule was random-lottery controlled, as in Experiment 2. 
Experiment 3a.  Probability Manipulation 
The testing phase consisted of nine probability blocks. The participants were exposed to 
constant reward values in the testing phase, while the probability of targets being presented 
on either side was manipulated. Half of the participants were shown higher reward (£10) on 
the right and low reward on the left (£2) and the other half were shown the opposite. The 
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probabilities and reward values were changed from Experiments 1 and 2 to match EV. There 
were three experimental conditions, each consisting of three consecutive blocks. In one 
condition, the target was equally likely to be on the right or the left-hand side. In the second 
condition, the target was presented on one side with probability 0.83 and the other side with 
probability 0.17.   These probabilities were then flipped spatially for the final condition. 
These probabilities and reward combinations lead to matched EV of £1.70 for two conditions:  
0.83/£2 and 0.17/£10.  
Experiment 3b. Reward Manipulation 
The other eighteen participants were exposed to constant probabilities of the 
presentation of targets across the experiment, while the reward values associated with targets 
was manipulated. Nine participants were presented with targets appearing on the right-hand 
side with probability 0.83 and the left-hand side with probability 0.17, and the other nine 
were shown the opposite. Again there were three experimental conditions, each consisting of 
three consecutive blocks. In one condition, the target was associated with equal reward (£6) 
on the right and the left-hand side. In the second condition, the target presented on one side 
was associated with £10 reward and other side with £2. The reward values were then flipped 
for the final condition. As before, these probabilities and reward combinations lead to 
matched EV of £1.70 for two conditions:  0.83/£2 and 0.17/£10.  
Stimuli 
All stimuli apart from the fixation point in the testing phase were identical to 
Experiment 2, and the task required at the target was the same. The fixation square in the 
testing phase contained three pound signs (£££) as a fixation point, presented in red (15.8 
cd/m2).  
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Participants 
Thirty-six participants (9 male) were recruited from the student population of the 
University of Bristol (approximate age range 18-25); eighteen assigned to Experiment 3a and 
likewise to 3b. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Participants were reimbursed £7 
for their time and received a variable performance related reward (£2, £6, or £10) as outlined 
above.   
Design 
There were two within-participant repeated-measure binary factors in both forms of the 
experiment: In the reward manipulation, one was block (£2/£10, £10/£2, £6/£6) and the other 
was side (0.83% probability and 0.17% probability). This led to 6 conditions: low probability, 
low reward; low probability, high reward; high probability, high reward; high probability, low 
reward; high probability, equal reward; low probability, equal reward. In the probability 
manipulation, one factor was block (83%/17%, 17%/83%, 50%/50%) and the other was side 
(£2 and £10). This led to 6 conditions: high reward, high probability; high reward, low 
probability; low reward, high probability; low reward, low probability; high reward, equal 
probability; low reward, equal probability. Therefore there were only 2 conditions in each 
form of the experiment that differed from the other: each was an isolated manipulation of 
reward or probability.   
The orders of conditions were counterbalanced using a latin square design. The 
dependent measures were the manual response time and saccade latency. 
 
Manual Response Analysis 
Experiment 3a 
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There were a total of 7776 trials recorded in the probability manipulation experiment 
(432 x 18 participants) and of these 6872 manual responses were correct/before the time-out. 
The distribution of the remaining 904 time-out/response errors is shown in the table below. 
The range of the total percentage of time-out/response errors across all participants was 3.7% 
to 18.5%. 
Experiment 3b 
As in experiment 3a, the total number of trials recorded was 7776. Of these trials 719 
manual responses were discarded due to an incorrect response or to the participant not 
responding in time. This left a total of 7057 trials. The distribution of errors across conditions 
is given in the table below. The range across participants of the total percentage of 
response/time-out errors was 2.5% to 16.7%. 
Saccadic Response Analysis 
Experiment 3a 
The same exclusion criteria as the previous experiments were applied.  Trials were 
excluded: where the initial fixation was greater than 3 degrees either side of the centre of the 
fixation box (16.3%; range across participants 1.39 - 39.1%); Saccade in the incorrect 
direction (1.97%; 0.46 - 3.94%) and anticipatory saccades in the correct direction (3.91%; 
0.23 - 10.42%). An additional criterion was applied so that all trials where the first saccade 
was initiated after the participant’s ‘time-out’ were discarded. Two participants had over 40% 
of trials excluded when these criteria were applied, so they were removed from the rest of the 
saccadic analysis. The remaining trials had a mean first saccade amplitude of 5.6 degrees 
(range across participants: 5.0 – 6.3 degrees).  After removing the invalid, anticipatory and 
error saccades, the total number of analysed saccades was 5379 (77.82%). 
Experiment 3b 
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The same exclusion criteria as the previous experiments was applied to initial fixation 
starting point: trials where the initial fixation was greater than 3 degrees either side of the 
centre of the fixation box (14.57%; range across participants: 1.85 – 40.97); saccades in the 
incorrect direction (3.47%; 0.23 – 9.95) and anticipatory saccades (6.36%; 1.16 - 10.88). All 
trials where the first saccade was initiated after the participant’s ‘time-out’ were also 
excluded. Five participants had over 40% of trials excluded when these criteria were applied, 
so they were removed from the rest of the saccadic analysis. The remaining trials had a mean 
first saccade amplitude of 5.29 degrees (range across participants: 4.37 – 5.79 degrees). After 
removing the invalid, anticipatory and error saccades, the total number of analysed saccades 
was 4246 (75.61%). 
 
Results 
Experiment 3a: Probability manipulation  
Manual Responses 
 
Table 3. 
 
There was a marginally significant effect of error type, with generally more time-out errors 
than response errors being present across participants (Repeated Measures ANOVA: [F(1, 17) 
= 4.28, p = 0.05]; Effect size (partial ETA) = 0.2).  
 
Figure 4. 
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A significant effect of target probability was seen on the manual response times 
(Repeated measures ANOVA: [F(2,17) = 26.6, p < 0.001]; Effect size (partial ETA) = 0.61). 
This significant effect is not present between the equal and high probabilities, as shown by 
the large and overlapping confidence intervals (CI 95%: High = 444 – 489; Equal = 462 – 
500), compared to a clear difference between these probabilities and the low probability (CI 
95%: 484 – 529). The two conditions with matched expected values (low probability & high 
reward, high probability & low reward) produced significantly different reaction times, with a 
mean difference of 39.1ms (CI 95%: 24 – 54.2). 
Although not significant, the data suggests a small effect of reward when the probability 
is equal across targets; this is clearly extinguished once the probabilities are unequal (Figure 
4).  
 Saccadic Responses 
The target probability had a significant effect on saccadic response times (Repeated 
Measures ANOVA: [F(2, 15) = 25.39, p < 0.001]; Effect size (partial ETA) = 0.63). Although 
the data shows a trend towards participants making faster saccades when the target is 
associated with high reward relative to low reward (Figure 4), this effect is not significant 
[F(1, 15) = 1.76, p = 0.21]. The effect of probability is only present between the low 
probability condition (CI 95%: 138 – 162.5) and the high/equal probability condition (CI 
95%: High = 127 – 143; Equal = 128 – 144), as can be clearly seen in the graph (Figure 4). 
When the Expected Value were matched across the two targets, (the ‘high reward, low 
probability’ and the ‘low reward, high probability’ points in Figure 4) there was a 9.63ms (CI 
95%: -1.48 – 20.73) increase in response time between the high probability side and the low 
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probability side. This result suggests that the processes underlying the reward and probability 
effect are not governed by EV.  
There was a significant interaction between the percentages of correct anticipatory 
saccades with reward side and probability condition across participants (Repeated measures 
ANOVA: [F(2, 15) = 8.69, p = 0.001]; Effect size (Partial ETA) = 0.37). There was no 
significant effect of reward side or probability condition on the percentage of correct 
anticipatory saccades (Reward side: [F(1, 15) = 1.23, p = 0.29], Probability Condition: [F(2, 
15) = 0.92, p = 0.41]). Additionally, there was no effect of either reward or probability on the 
percentage of anticipatory saccades in the incorrect direction (Reward side: [F(1, 15) = 0.03, 
p = 0.9], Probability Condition: [F(2, 15) = 0.3, p = 0.74]) but there was a significant 
interaction ([F(2, 15) = 11.8, p < 0.001]; Effect size (Partial ETA) = 0.44). 
 
Experiment 3b: Reward manipulation  
Manual Responses 
 
Table 4.  
 
There was a significant effect of probability on both the frequency of time-out and 
response errors made, where more errors were made overall in the low probability direction 
(Time-out errors: Repeated measures ANOVA: [F(1, 17) = 36.16, p < 0.001]; Effect size 
(Partial ETA) = 0.68; Response errors: Repeated measures ANOVA: [F(1, 17) = 7.8, p = 
0.012]; Effect size (Partial ETA) = 0.32).  
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Figure 5. 
 
Target probability had a significant effect on manual responses: response times were 
shorter for the higher probability side (Repeated Measures ANOVA: [F(1, 17) = 39, p 
<0.001]; Effect size (partial ETA) = 0.7). The reward manipulation had no significant effect 
on the manual responses across participants [F(2, 17) = 2.33, p = 0.11)]. There was a 
significant difference between the conditions for which the expected value was matched 
across the two targets, with a mean difference of 35.26ms (CI 95%: 15.14 – 55.37); this 
suggests EV did not govern manual responses.  
Saccadic responses 
There was no significant effect of target probability or reward on saccadic response 
times (Repeated Measures ANOVA; Reward condition: [F(2, 12) = 0.59, p = 0.56], 
Probability: [F(1, 12) = 3.53, p = 0.09]). The data showed a trend towards an effect of 
probability in the high and equal reward conditions, although this was not evident in the low 
reward condition (Figure 4).  
The correct anticipatory saccade trials were analysed by frequency within reward 
condition and probability sides, and the percentages of the total possible trials were calculated 
for each participant. There was a significant effect of probability on the percentage of correct 
anticipatory saccades, whereby more anticipatory saccades were made towards the higher 
probability target (Repeated Measures ANOVA: [F(1, 12) = 14.33, p = 0.003]; Effect size 
(partial ETA) = 0.54). There was no effect of reward on the percentage of correct anticipatory 
saccades [F(2, 12) = 1.01, p = 0.38], nor an effect of either reward or probability on the 
percentage of anticipatory saccades in the incorrect direction (Reward: [F(2, 12) = 0.8, p = 
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0.46], Probability: [F(1, 12) = 2.75, p = 0.12]). As with the manual results there was no 
evidence of expected value governing saccadic response times, as the reaction times across 
matched expected value conditions were significantly different (Mean = 10.97, CI 95%: 0.49 
– 21.45).  
 
Discussion 
Across Experiments 3a and 3b there was a consistent effect of target probability on 
manual and saccadic responses: participants’ response times were faster to targets associated 
with higher probability, as found in Experiment 1. However, there was no significant effect of 
probability on the saccadic responses in Experiment 3b. There was a trend for faster 
responses to higher probability and slower responses to lower probability in the high and 
equal reward conditions, but this effect was completely extinguished in the low reward 
condition. In Experiment 3a, the probability effect was only present between the high/equal 
and the low probability conditions.  
There was no significant effect of reward in either Experiment 3a or 3b, and no 
evidence to suggest that EV could predict either saccadic or manual responses. In the manual 
results of Experiment 3a, some evidence was found to suggest that a small reward effect was 
present only when probability was equal across targets.  
These results suggest that the reward effect is significantly modulated when there are 
unequal probabilities of the targets that rewards are associated with. It could be that the 
strength of the probability effect completely dominates the modulation in behaviour and thus 
these processes do not combine in a simple manner. Our results suggest that there are 
differences between the two processes governing reward and probability, but that they do not 
act completely independently on behaviour.  
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Experiment 4: Isolated reward and probability 
We next report the final experiment investigating the effects of reward and probability 
in isolation, using the same paradigm for both effects and a within-subjects design. This was 
to allow for a direct comparison of the reward and probability effect without combining them 
together, and by running both isolated conditions on the same participants, to examine 
whether the two effects are correlated. Given the smaller and less reliable effect of probability 
and reward on saccadic responses in comparison to manual responses in the last three 
experiments, only manual responses have been recorded in Experiment 4.  Additionally, the 
same two keys were used to respond to targets on the left and right-hand side of the screen so 
that participants only used one hand to respond. In the previous experiments it is not clear at 
what stage in processing the manual response advantages reported previously occur.  As each 
side was unequally associated with a particular hand it is entirely possible that the speeding 
up was a result of some low-level motor readiness associated with one hand rather than the 
other. By having both responses (left or right) being made by the same hand this allows a test 
of whether these effects are more central than this explanation suggests.    
 
Methods 
Procedure 
The task layout was the same as the last three experiments, except that regardless of 
which hemifield the target was presented in, the same two buttons on the keyboard were used 
to indicate the orientation of the letter T. The experiment consisted of a practice phase (10 
trials), a pre-test phase (36 trials), and then 12 blocks (36 trials each) of the testing phase. The 
same reward schedule was employed as in Experiment 3.  
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Stimuli 
All stimuli and the fixation square were the same as the previous experiments. The 
fixation square contained a single cross presented in red (15.8 cd/m2) and in font size 17. The 
testing phase was split into two sections – the reward manipulation and the probability 
manipulation. In the reward manipulation the target was presented on either side in an equal 
number of trials across all conditions, whereas the frequency changed in different conditions 
of the probability manipulation. Half the participants were exposed to the reward conditions 
first, and half to the probability. In the reward manipulation, there were three conditions: high 
reward right (£2/£10), high reward left (£10/£2), and equal reward (£6/£6). In the probability 
manipulation, there were again three conditions: high probability right (0.17/0.83), high 
probability left (0.83/0.17) and equal probability (0.5/0.5). Each condition consisted of two 
consecutive blocks of 36 trials. These probabilities were chosen as they are the closest match 
to £10/£2 reward proportions. To ensure motivation within the probability conditions was not 
decreased compared to the reward conditions, rewards were fixed at £6 across the whole 
section. This meant that the equal reward and equal probability conditions were exactly the 
same. Feedback on incorrect/slow trials was given as in Experiment 3. 
Participants 
Eighteen participants (eleven female) were recruited from the student population of the 
University of Bristol (mean: 22.8, range: 18 - 40). All had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. Participants were reimbursed £6 for their time and received a variable performance 
related reward (£0, £2, £6 or £10) as outlined above. They were asked to use their self-
reported dominant hand to do the experiment (14 right-handed). The study was approved by 
The Faculty of Science Human Research Ethics Committee at the University of Bristol. 
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Design 
There were two within participant repeated measure factors: probability (high, low or 
equal) and reward (high, low or equal) leading to six conditions: High probability, low 
probability, equal probability; High reward, low reward, equal reward. The orders of the 
blocks were counterbalanced using a latin square design across participants, and participants 
were told which condition they were in at the start of each block.  The dependent measure 
was the manual response time.  
Manual Response Analysis 
A total of 7776 trials were recorded (432 x 18 participants). For the manual reaction 
times we excluded 588 time-out and 470 response errors, leaving a total of 6718 data points. 
The distribution of errors is shown in Table 5. The range of the total percentage of time-
out/response errors of each participant’s responses was 0.9% - 27.78%. 
 
 
 
Results 
Manual Responses 
 
Table 5. 
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Figure 6.  
 
We found that reward value had a significant effect on manual reaction times, and 
exhibited a linear relationship across the three conditions (Figure 6) (Repeated Measures 
ANOVA: [F(2, 17) = 7.55, p = 0.002]; Effect size (partial ETA squared) = 0.31). Probability 
also had a significant effect on manual reaction times, and a linear relationship can also be 
seen in Figure 6 (Repeated Measures ANOVA: [F(2, 17) = 28.03, p < 0.001]; Effect size 
(partial ETA squared) = 0.62). There was no difference between reward and probability in the 
equal condition (Figure 6): these conditions were identical besides from the participants 
experiencing them within the reward or probability manipulation of the experiment.   
There were significantly more time-out errors made the lower the probability or reward 
value was across the experiment (Probability: Repeated Measures ANOVA: [F(2,17) = 27.03, 
p < 0.001]; Effect size (partial ETA squared) = 0.61; Reward: Repeated Measures ANOVA: 
[F(2,17) = 6.13, p = 0.005]; Effect size (partial ETA squared) = 0.27). However, there was no 
effect of reward or probability on the frequency of response errors (Probability: [F(2, 17) = 
0.84, p = 0.44], Reward: [F(2, 17) = 2.79, p = 0.08])  
There was only a weak non-significant positive correlation between the effect of reward 
and probability across all participants (Figure 6, right hand panel; correlation coefficient = 
0.24, N.S. [p=0.34]). Because the response was now uni-manual, and so lateralized, we next 
investigated if these was an effect on the side of presentation of the target. The data was split 
for the 14 right-handed participants into manual responses made to the left or the right-hand 
target. We ran two repeated measures ANOVAs for both reward/probability conditions, and 
found that there was no significant difference between manual responses made to the left or 
Reward and Probability 
 
 
38 
right side target (Repeated Measures ANOVAs: Left/right side of probability condition: [F(1, 
17) = 0.01,  p = 0.92],  or for the left/right side of reward condition: [F(1, 17) = 3.12, p =0.1]).  
 
Experiment 4: Discussion 
Reward and probability had a significant linear effect on the manual reaction times, 
whereby responses were faster to targets associated with higher reward and higher 
probability. This modulation in responses was larger in the probability manipulation. It was 
found that the lower the reward or probability, the greater the frequency of time-out errors; 
this suggests, as discussed in the introduction, that both high reward and probability could 
lead to increased motor preparation (Basso & Wurtz, 1997; Dorris & Munoz, 1998; Koval et 
al., 2004). Additionally, it was found that there was no difference between responses made to 
targets on the right or the left-hand side of the screen. It could be concluded from this that 
spatial mapping of visual stimuli to manual responses is not an important aspect of the effect 
of reward and probability on reaction times.   
The results of Experiment 4 show that the effect of reward on manual responses is 
smaller than the effect of probability. One factor that could affect this is the likelihood of 
individual differences in sensitivity to reward. A number of studies have identified this, for 
example Hickey, Chelazzi, and Theeuwes (2010b) measured trait reward-seeking using a 
personality index, and found this correlated with the magnitude of reward priming in a visual 
search task. The term “reward priming” was used to describe the bias towards selection of 
objects previously characterised as rewarding (Hickey et al., 2010b). They also found in a 
similar study that the ERP component known to be a sufficient index for reward processing in 
the anterior cingulate cortex is elicited during reward feedback processing, and that the 
magnitude of this predicts the effect of reward on each participant’s behaviour during visual 
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search (Hickey et al., 2010a). Linking primary explicit reward to a personality trait and 
linking it to a single neural system would suggest that the magnitude of the reward effects 
across response types should be correlated across participants.  If a participant is particularly 
reward sensitive this sensitivity should be expressed both in their saccadic and their manual 
responses.  In Experiments 2 and 3 there is no evidence in favour of such a correlation, 
despite having quite large variability in reward sensitivity across participants and finding 
reliable reward effects overall. However, we should be wary of making conclusions about 
individual differences with a relatively small sample size. 
There was no correlation between reward and probability in our data, this also supports 
the results of Experiment 3 where we did not see these processes combining in a simple 
manner. This could be partly due to the differences in the nature of reward and probability; 
the probability of events or objects appearance in our environment is inherent and continues 
to exist (albeit fluctuating) even if not observed. The explicit reward value attributed to an 
event or object relies on the way in which we perceive it and is thus dependent on many other 
factors that can differ between individuals (utility, internal state etc). Several authors have 
suggested information acquired at fixation can be thought of as a secondary (implicit) reward 
and can mediate gaze-learning patterns (Tatler, Hayhoe, Land, & Ballard, 2011; Jovancevic-
Misic & Hayhoe, 2009). Paeye, Schütz and Gegenfurtner (2016) have showed that finding a 
target (therefore acquiring information) at a location can reinforce eye movements in visual 
search. Therefore, if probability dominates when combined with explicit reward it may be 
that there is an intrinsic reward component from exploration of the target that is stronger than 
explicit reward in isolation. This would mean that higher probability is associated with higher 
implicit reward. This is supported by the results of Experiment 4 which show the isolated 
probability effect to be greater and more robust within participants than explicit reward. One 
way to formally investigate this is to look at whether the simple combining of reward and 
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probability as Expected Value (probability of rewarded event X magnitude of the reward, as 
discussed in the introduction) can explain the data across our four experiments. 
 
Modelling the Data 
The Expected Value (EV) at a particular location (n) is given by: 
𝐸𝑉𝑛 = 𝑃𝑛𝑅𝑛  (1) 
Where P is the probability of a rewarded event in that location and R is the reward at that 
location.  
In the experiments in this paper there are only two locations which we will label 1 and 2 so 
Relative Expected Value (REV) at location 1 is given by: 
𝑅𝐸𝑉1 =
𝐸𝑉1
𝐸𝑉1+𝐸𝑉2
    (2) 
Note also that: 
𝑅𝐸𝑉1 = 1 −  𝑅𝐸𝑉2  (3) 
𝑃1 = 1 −  𝑃2  (4) 
We want to determine the extent to which the REV determines the response times (RT) 
observed across experiments so we also calculate a simple metric of the relative response 
time differences in a given condition where there are two possible response locations.  We 
chose to use the percentage difference (PD) in reaction time which we define as: 
𝑃𝐷 = 100
𝑅𝑇1−𝑅𝑇2
𝑅𝑇̅̅ ̅̅
     (5) 
As REV1 is dependent on REV2 (see equation 3) we only plot the data from the location 
with the higher REV. 
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For Experiment 1 the Reward was 0 so REV is undefined across these conditions.  For 
the remaining conditions we can plot and correlate REV and PD.  Figure 7 plots this 
relationship.  The correlation coefficient is low (r=0.174).  This simple formulation of REV 
does not appear to capture the variability in the response time data well. An explanation for 
this might be due to the difference in our experimental design compared to Milstein and 
Dorris’ (2007) study. They employed a paradigm whereby reward is associated with every 
single trial and built up in small increments. This means for example than an incorrect/slow 
response to a high probability but low reward trial means overall reward is reduced by a 
relatively small amount, rather than increasing the likelihood of receiving £0 reward overall 
(as in our series of experiments). Essentially the stakes are higher per trial in our study. EV 
does not explain our data well. 
Having collected the data for the series of experiment reported here, and as a result of 
the poor fits that we obtained for REV we became aware of an argument in the literature for 
there being an intrinsic reward associated with exploration and information acquisition (see 
Collins, 2012; Deaner, Khera, and Platt 2005; Tatler et al., 2011) as discussed. As a result we 
carried out a further post-hoc modelling exercise, which is an extension of the REV model. 
Within this extension of the REV model the total reward associated with a location 
consists of the explicit reward associated with that location (E) plus an intrinsic reward 
associated with exploration of that location (I).   
𝑅𝑛 = 𝐸𝑛 + 𝐼𝑛   (6) 
For our experiments, I will be a function of the probability of the rewarded target 
occurring at that location (P) multiplied by some weighting factor (k) to scale the effects of 
the explicit and intrinsic rewards. 
   𝑅𝑛 = 𝐸𝑛 + (𝑘𝑃𝑛)  (7) 
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Combining (1) and (7) gives: 
𝐸𝑉𝑛 = 𝑃𝑛(𝐸𝑛 + 𝑘𝑃𝑛)  (8) 
Combining (2) and (8) gives: 
𝑅𝐸𝑉1 =
𝑃1(𝐸1+𝑘𝑃1)  
𝑃1(𝐸1+𝑘𝑃1)  +𝑃2(𝐸2+𝑘𝑃2)
     (9) 
 
We label this new measure of Relative Expected Value as REV+. We next carried out a 
linear fit between PD and REV+ for each condition across all the experiments fitting a single 
value of k as a free parameter.  In this fitting procedure, we exclude Experiment 1 as before.   
 
Figure 7. 
 
The fit is extremely good with a correlation coefficient r=0.95.  These data are plotted 
as disks in Figure 7 (right hand graph).   The fit estimates k as 17.31.  In other words if the 
target is equally likely to come up on both sides (i.e. P=0.5) and there is no Explicit Reward 
(E) then the Implicit Reward is equivalent to £9.17 which is close to the highest Explicit 
Reward value that we used across the experiments (£10).  We can now use the model to 
generate predictions for the results from Experiment 1 given that there was no explicit 
reward.  These results are shown as crosses in Figure 7 (right hand graph) and appear to be an 
excellent fit to the model as well.  
Implicit reward clearly plays a large part in determining behaviour in these 
experiments. However, note that explicit reward still has an important part to play.  Explicit 
reward still modulates responses across Experiments 2 and 4 when the probability (and 
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therefore implicit reward) is the same across the targets. These data are well fitted by the 
model highlighting the contribution explicit reward plays in the model fits. 
Although we see weaker effects of reward and probability on saccadic responses across 
the first three experiments, our model is still a good fit to the saccadic response data (r = 
0.84) particularly when compared to the simple Expected Value model (r = -0.01).  
 
General Discussion 
Response Modalities 
We replicated the probability effect established in the literature across the four 
experiments, however this effect was weaker in the saccadic responses and we find no 
evidence that it was correlated across response modalities. The results of the experiments (2-
4) on reward manipulations showed a stronger effect of reward on manual than saccadic 
responses. Both the effects of reward and of probability on different response modalities seem 
to be sensitive to the time course of the stimulus presentation. In the literature, stronger 
probability effects are seen on saccadic responses when the ISI is shorter. Additionally, given 
our model which supports an implicit reward component related to probability, in general the 
stronger effect on manual responses across Experiments 1 to 3 could be linked to the time 
course of dopamine activation (Schultz, 2007). Activations in dopamine neurons to reward-
predicting stimuli are very fast and have latencies of 60-100ms and endure for less than 
200ms. Fast saccadic responses may be initiated too early to be affected as strongly by the 
dopaminergic activation, when compared to longer latency manual responses.   
Saccadic reaction times may also have been reduced by the presence of a perceptual 
task at the saccadic target and could explain why there was no correlation between response 
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modalities. The inclusion of a perceptual task at the landing point of the saccade clearly 
constitutes a form of information worth gathering as a correct response leads to receiving 
reward. Supporting this Montagnini and Chelazzi (2005) found that a perceptual task at a 
saccadic target reduces reaction times by up to 15% and more recently Wolf and Schütz 
(2017) found saccadic reaction times were reduced by up to 40ms by the performance of a 
perceptual task at the target (when task relevant visual information is foveated). The fast 
saccadic responses seen across the four experiments could constitute a ‘floor effect’ whereby 
little room is left for further modulations by reward and probability. 
Perhaps more pertinent to the differences across response modalities is the effect of 
negative feedback on manual response speed and accuracy. Across all experiments, a stronger 
effect of probability/reward was seen on manual responses than saccadic. The motivation to 
respond is more clearly focussed on the manual response to the target, which is explicitly 
goal-oriented given that the button press required is the primary task for the participants. This 
is then directly linked to the speed and accuracy of the response and thus the feedback 
received on each trial. This could explain why we see a stronger effect of reward and 
probability on manual responses compared to saccadic: the purpose of the saccade is 
primarily to gather information (Hickey et al., 2010a). With regards to this point, and the 
absence of correlation between saccadic and manual responses across all experiments, it is 
unlikely that both response modalities could be explained by a decision-making model where 
all signals across pathways are brought together with different decision thresholds for 
different responses (Bompas & Sumner, 2008). However, it is important to note that the 
difference in the purpose and execution of the saccadic and manual response in these 
experiments could be the significant factor that sets the two response modalities apart and 
leads to the lack of evidence for a correlation. As discussed in the introduction, the pre-motor 
theory of attention suggests a common source of information is used for all types of motor 
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responses and that the same decision threshold would apply to all responses (Bompas & 
Sumner, 2008). The decision threshold for the saccadic latency in the experiments reported 
here relates to the side on which the target has appeared. Conversely, the decision threshold 
for the manual response additionally encapsulates the time taken to reach a binary perceptual 
decision at the location of the target; this is unrelated to the spatial position of the target. Thus 
it follows that these two responses may be too different to be able to combine as a common 
source of information. Further work investigating both response modalities in a paradigm 
where the perceptual task requires a similar goal-oriented fast and accurate saccadic and 
concurrent manual response (e.g. a saccade up or down to indicate the orientation of a letter 
T) could clarify this issue.  
 
Probability, Explicit and Intrinsic Reward 
Our simple single parameter model provides a very good fit to a wide range of data 
across the manual response data and the saccadic data. Even in the absence of explicit 
primary rewards (such as in Experiment 1) the predictions of the model fit the data well. 
Without the presence of primary rewards, the purpose of eye movements is to obtain 
information, which is used to achieve behavioural goals (Tatler et al., 2011). The behavioural 
goal in our series of experiments would be the manual response, which is then directly linked 
to the obtaining of information. This acquisition of information and subsequent reaching of 
behavioural goal can be thought of as a secondary reward (Tatler et al., 2011). This is 
supported by a model by Sprague and Ballard (2003), which assumes eye movements are 
valued by estimating the expected cost of the uncertainty that will result if the movement is 
not made. Therefore, reward is maximised by allocating implicit reward to the behaviour that 
stands to lose the most (Sprague & Ballard, 2003). If we consider the example of a high and 
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low probability manipulation, the higher probability location will always provide the most 
information and thus might be prioritised over the low probability location regardless of the 
explicit primary reward. This has been researched explicitly in the saccadic domain, in a 
study where participants learnt that targets at one location were more likely to remain visible 
after a successful saccade than targets at other locations (Collins, 2012). Saccades to these 
targets were faster, more frequent and harder to inhibit than saccades to other targets. This 
increase in saccadic readiness towards locations more likely to lead to increase in visual 
information suggest post-saccadic visual feedback acts an implicit reward.  Collins (2012) 
suggests that sensory-motor systems have their own intrinsic reward, and that informational 
content is likely to be a more relevant “currency” for the oculomotor system than monetary or 
other explicit primary reward. This informational content may simply be a clearer view of 
visual objects, and this in itself may be rewarding and contribute to on-going movement 
monitoring in learning (Collins, 2012). These studies and the results of our experiments 
further support the theory that eye movement decision are being more affected by biases in 
how we move our eyes rather than those biases contributing to image salience (Tatler et al., 
2011).   
Research on non-human primates has quantified the intrinsic reward associated with 
looking at particular visual stimuli (Deaner, Khera, & Platt, 2005; Shepherd, Deaner, & Platt, 
2006). One study found that rhesus macaques differentially value the opportunity to acquire 
visual information about members of their social group, modulated by their social status 
(Deaner, Khera, & Platt 2005). The monkeys sacrificed liquid reward for visual information 
about higher status individuals, and required overpayment of juice to view lower social status 
members (Deaner, Khera, & Platt 2005). Here they have used liquid as a measurable explicit 
equivalent of an implicit reward resulting from gaze. This supports our suggestion that 
looking in itself provides an implicit reward; dopaminergic machinery appears to be 
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intimately related to the sensitivity of eye movement target selection to behavioural 
outcomes. Further support for the influence of implicit reward on the dopaminergic system 
comes from a model of reward processing in the basal ganglia in humans, where the contrast 
between reinforcement probabilities is enhanced by subtracting “Go” learning (speeding up 
responses for higher probabilities) and “NoGo” learning (slowing down responses to lower 
probabilities) associations but large reward magnitudes are underweighted (Frank, 2005; 
Frank & Claus, 2006; cited in Moustafa, Cohen, Sherman, & Frank, 2008). 
The lesser influence of explicit reward in our studies could also be explained by the 
paradigm used, specifically the absence of dual-target (choice) trials. Milstein and Dorris 
(2007, 2011) found that during dual-target trials, the higher reward magnitude target was 
more frequently chosen. Latencies in single-target trials were more affected by expected 
value than by reward magnitude alone; this contradicts our results. Given that these different 
trial types were interleaved within the same experiment, an interaction may have affected the 
results (Wolf, Heuer, Schubö, & Schütz, 2017). Wolf et al (2017) found that having dual 
target (choice) trials interleaved in blocks modulated saccadic and manual latencies to 
differential reward values in single target trials, but this modulation was mostly absent in 
blocks with no dual target trials. In light of our findings, it’s possible that the weaker effects 
of reward seen are because reward is more likely to affect preparation of responses when it is 
more behaviourally relevant, as when choice trials are present.  In these instances it is more 
beneficial to prioritise the more rewarding target/side.  
The results of our four experiments indicate the importance of considering implicit 
reward in behavioural reward studies. Different types of bias that affect our response to 
stimuli in the environment rarely combine in a simple manner, particularly biases like explicit 
(primary) reward, that can vary hugely in ‘currency’ and are dependent on the goals of the 
individual. Our results suggest that reward may have an implicit component that comes from 
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gaining information and achieving task-related goals. The importance of secondary implicit 
rewards is particularly clear when we consider that primary rewards (even more so monetary) 
rarely happen in real life from a simple eye movement or hand movement. Acquiring 
information and achieving task goals are the most likely real-life purpose of the many 
saccades and hand movements made during this task, which then ultimately lead to primary 
rewards that are important for survival. Our findings suggest that a different approach to 
reward related studies in humans, rather than just providing primary monetary reward, could 
further our understanding of the governing processes and reward circuitry.   
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Tables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Target probability 
0.75 0.5 0.25 
Time-Out Response 
Errors 
Time-Out Response Errors Time-Out Response Errors 
5.52 (2.78-9.03) 4.05 (0-9.72) 6.02 (1.04-14.58) 4.57 (0-16.67) 8.33 (0-22.92) 5.44 (0-16.67) 
Table 1. the mean percentage of errors (of the total number of possible trials in each condition), 
for both types; time-outs and response errors. The range across 18 participants is given in 
parentheses. 
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Side 
Block Type 
High Block Low Block 
Time-Out Response Errors Time-Out Response Errors 
High Reward 6.62 (0-13.9) 7.19 (0-20.8) 7.92 (1.40-19.4) 6.78 (0-20.8) 
Low Reward 9.89 (1.39-34.7) 8.25 (1.39-19.4) 9.72 (2.77-25.0) 6.54 (0-19.4) 
Table 2. The mean percentage of errors for Experiment 2, for both error types: time-outs and 
response errors. The range across 17 participants is given in parentheses  
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Side 
Block Type 
Equal Probability Probability same direction as 
reward 
Probability opposite direction 
to reward 
Time-Out Response 
Errors 
Time-Out Response 
Errors 
Time-Out Response 
Errors 
High 
Reward 
7.1 (2.78 - 
23.6) 
5.25 (0 - 9.7) 4.81 (0.83 -
13.3) 
4.58 (0.83 - 
7.5) 
6.94 (0 -29.17) 6.94 (0 -16.67) 
Low 
Reward 
8.1 (0 -20.83) 4.5 (0 -22.2) 10.42 (0 - 25) 5.79 (0 -
16.67) 
5.93 (0 -
14.17 
3.98 (0 -
9.17) 
Table 3: Mean percentage of errors for Experiment 3a across the three probability conditions 
and two reward sides. Errors are split into time-out errors and response errors. The range of 
error percentages across participants in each condition are given in brackets. 
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Table 4: Mean percentage of errors in Experiment 3b across the three reward conditions and 
high and low probability sides. Errors are split into time-out errors, where participants did 
not make the manual response within the allocated time, and response errors. The range 
across participants is given in brackets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Side 
Block Type 
Equal Reward Reward same direction as 
probability 
Reward opposite direction to 
probability 
Time-Out Response 
Errors 
Time-Out Response 
Errors 
Time-Out Response 
Errors 
High 
Probability 
3.7 (0 – 8.3) 4.07 (0.83 - 
10) 
3.66 (0 – 9.17) 3.8 (0 - 10) 3.98 (0 – 9.17)  4.07 (0 – 
12.5) 
Low 
Probability 
 9.95 (0 – 
16.7) 
6.25 (0 - 25)  10.42 (0 – 
29.17) 
 7.41 (0 – 
20.83) 
 8.33 (0 – 
20.83) 
 7.64 (0 – 
29.17) 
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Side 
Condition 
Probability Reward 
Time-Out Response Errors Time-Out Response Errors 
High  5.05 (0-9.17) 4.86 (0.83-19.17) 6.67 (1.39-16.67) 6.85 (0-15.28) 
Low  18.87 (0-33.3) 9.23 (0-25) 10.34 (1.39-23.6) 8.91 (0-27.78) 
Equal  8.3 (1.39-20.83) 7.84 (0-18.06) 7.68 (0-18.06) 7.64 (0-16.67) 
 
Table 5. The mean percentage of errors for Experiment 4 for both error types. The range 
across 18 participants is given in brackets. 
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Figure 7 
 
 
Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1. Diagram of the experimental procedure in the testing phase. The figure depicts an 
example trial where the target appears on the right-hand side. 
 
Figure 2. The results from Experiment 1.  Graph of mean of median manual response times 
(left hand plot) and saccadic response times (right hand plot) for Experiment 1. The three x-
axis points denote the different probabilities associated with targets, with the data having 
been pooled from targets presented in the left and right hemispheres. The error bars are 
calculated within subjects and are the standard error of the mean.   
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Figure 3; Graph of mean of median manual response times (left hand side) and saccadic 
response times (right hand side) for Experiment 2. The two lines show the two different 
conditions (high reward magnitude and low reward magnitude) and the two x-axis points 
denote the reward associated with the targets (high and low reward). The within-subject 
error bars are the standard error of the mean. 
 
Figure 4: Graph of the mean of median manual reaction times (left hand graph) and median 
saccadic reaction times (right hand graph) across participants for Experiment 3a. Each line 
represents a different probability, with the data split within blocks according to the 
probability associated with a particular target. The two x-axis points show the reward 
associated with the target. The within-subject error bars are the standard error of the mean.  
 
Figure 5: Graph of the mean of median manual response times (left hand side) and saccadic 
response times (right hand side) for Experiment 3b. The three lines show the different reward 
conditions, which are grouped into low/high/equal reward rather than the conditions within 
the experiment. The x-axis gives the target probability. The within-subject error bars are the 
standard error of the mean. 
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Figure 6. Experiment 4.  Left hand graph: manual response time. The two lines show the two 
different conditions (reward and probability) and the three x-axis points denote the level of 
reward or probability associated with the target. The within-subject error bars are the 
standard error of the mean. Right hand graph: Scatter plot of the slope of the probability 
effect against the slope of the reward effect across all participants. 
 
Figure 7: Left-hand side: the relationship between Change in Reaction Time plotted against 
Relative Expected Value.  The values plotted represent means from each condition across all 
4 experiments. Right-hand side: the relationship between Change in Reaction Time plotted 
against Relative Expected Value+.  The values plotted represent means from each condition 
across all 4 experiments. 
 
 
 
